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Abstract: Textbooks in physics use science history to humanize the subject and motivate stu-
dents for learning, but they deal exclusively with the heroes of the field and ignore the vast
majority of scientists who have not found their way into history. What is the role of these invis-
ible scientists — are they merely the worker ants in the colony of science, whose main utility is
to facilitate the heroes of the field?
1 Introduction
As students of the sciences, we start our studies filled
with enthusiasm and ambition, drinking up technical de-
tails while reading about the theories and experiments of
our great predecessors — Newton, Darwin, Einstein, et al.
After years of study, as we gain in ability and reach the fron-
tiers of knowledge in our chosen disciplines, we encounter
the harsh realities of research and struggle to push forward.
While some succeed and receive the accolades of their peers,
many give up and leave science altogether, some tire of the
struggle and focus on teaching, while others push on with-
out wide recognition of their work. These latter two groups
form the majority of practicing scientists — the 99% whose
work rarely finds a place in the standard textbooks and yet
who are nevertheless responsible for the majority of scientific
publications. How are these to see their role in the whole
effort? Are they really, as the disregard of most science bi-
ographies seems to imply, merely worker ants in the colony
of science, whose main utility is to facilitate the work of our
betters?
While this tension between ambition and reality is hardly
unique to the sciences, it is something that most scientific re-
searchers face, even if only subconsciously. Physicist Koichi
Mano once wrote to his former teacher Richard Feynman of
his feelings of inadequacy, to which Feynman replied by ex-
plaining how most of what the famous scientist had worked
on was in fact second-rate work or outright failure: “I have
worked on innumerable problems that you would call hum-
ble, but which I enjoyed and felt very good about because
I sometimes could partially succeed.... No problem is too
small or too trivial if we can really do something about
it.” [[1], p. 201.] This feeling of progress and achievement,
even if on only small problems, is important to the psychol-
ogy of all creative work. In his reply, Feynman continues by
explaining that the ideals imbibed by students — the ideals
of the heroic model of science — are impractical for day-to-
day research work. Even some scientists considered great by
their contemporaries have suffered from feelings of inade-
quacy, as Paul Ehrenfest did in the 1930s.[2]
Framing a dramatic narrative for the biographies of fa-
mous scientists has been central to creating these impractical
ideals. In these stories, a successful scientist’s life is typically
depicted as a hero’s quest, and the vanquishing of the un-
known as the conquest. While this convenient framework
motivates each biography and drives its narrative, heroes of
history are often figureheads for the armies that they lead.
Without the armies to support them, they can achieve little
of lasting value. And so it is with science, though scientific
biographers work hard to draw a contrast between the pri-
mary subjects of their study and the often nameless group
of colleagues surrounding them. While recognition of these
colleagues’ names has not survived, their efforts have never-
theless been essential for the advances achieved by science.
2 What makes a scientist great?
Some geniuses stand so far above us in their insights that
they seem alien in their ability. Isaac Newton formulated
the laws of motion, discovered a mathematical description
of gravity, created calculus, invented the first practical re-
flecting telescope, built the theory of color based on the light
spectrum, and added a host of other scientific accomplish-
ments. Any one of these would have immortalized his name
in science, and yet he did them all. Einstein discovered the
photoelectric effect and thus the first convincing proof of the
existence of photons as quanta; he derived the equivalence
formula for mass and energy, saw that the Lorentz contrac-
tion implied the relativity of frames of reference, and real-
ized that inertial motion having no preferential frame further
implied a change to the laws of gravity, among many more
accomplishments. The achievements of these two great sci-
entists, however, stand so high that even to the scientific elite
of today their accomplishments appear incredible. What his-
torical narratives often fail to capture, however, is that these
accomplishments are built upon the prior work of other (of-
ten forgotten) scientists, and that even the greatest achieve-
ments of the scientific elite merely move the timeline of sci-
ence forward a little. If Newton had succumbed to sickness
as a child, then it is difficult to imagine that the science of
today would be much retarded by the change. His discov-
eries would have remained hidden by Nature for perhaps a
few decades, but would have been discovered nevertheless.
Almost nothing in science has the sense of being without a
direct antecedent.
The two characteristics that we generally associate most
with great scientists are their productivity for creating useful
ideas and the profundity of those ideas. Two additional char-
acteristics that go largely unmentioned, however, is their
outstanding ability to communicate, and that many of them
have been lucky. While both of these latter characteristics are
not what we usually associate with scientific greatness, they
are nevertheless critical for achieving the highest status and
recognition.
Researchers with greater skill in writing and speak-
ing have a huge advantage over their less fluent peers in
garnering recognition for their work. Clear explanations
and proper emphasis makes it easier for others to under-
stand new ideas. Moreover, announcing a discovery to the
right people, and in the right way, brings rapid acceptance,
whereas publishing a result in turgid prose within an ob-
scure journal is little better than dropping the results into
a trash bin. Elite scientists do a recognizably better job at
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communicating their work. Richard Feynman is widely re-
spected as much for his non-technical writing and his teach-
ing as for his scientific discoveries. For what is probably his
most famous discovery — the Feynman diagrams — Feyn-
man spent years talking to people, explaining, and basically
proselytizing to get his idea recognized and understood. [[3],
p.29] Einstein’s scientific papers are written with an unri-
valled crystalline clarity and an apparent effortlessness that
makes his ideas easy to follow. These communication skills
are not just that of narrating a theory but rather of framing
a story in which the theory is a part, in order to shape our
understanding of its physical significance and importance.
The second little-acknowledged characteristic of the
great scientists is that they were generally lucky.[4] This may
take the form of being born into a family of means for sup-
porting their higher education, but also of having parents
who foster scientific thinking from an early age. Later in
their careers, luck may take the form of having just the right
timing, of selecting just the right mentor, or of choosing just
the right research project, to achieve results of fundamen-
tal importance.[5, 6] Physicists Lawrence Bragg and Brian
Josephson have their names attached to discoveries made
while in their early 20s, while pursuing research under the
guidance of a senior scientist. While these examples may
seem to indicate a lucky choice of direction for research,
many people feel that even if a great scientist had not made
the specific discoveries for which he or she later became fa-
mous, he or she would have worked on something else and
have found something important there instead. That is, they
feel that their greatness is robust. But if we accept that luck
is at least partly a factor, and that many of the great scien-
tists are really only known for one great accomplishment,
then the robustness of their greatness feels less convincing.
Thomas Bayes, for example, was respected by his peers but
is now known only for his work on developing one equation,
and that published posthumously, with the rest of his life’s
work having no significant influence on modern science.
The advantages of luck and skillful communication,
while not belonging to the technical part of scientists’ discov-
eries, thus play a critical role in immortalizing many scien-
tists’ work and in deciding who receives the primary recog-
nition for the achievement. Whether fair or not, scientists
hampered by poor luck and poor communication skills are
often left unrecognized.[7] So much of scientific historical
writing, including that written by scientists themselves, ig-
nores these factors and builds a mythology founded on its
heroes. This mythologizing, however, obscures the truth
that the great scientific advancements were shaped by luck
and writing skill, and were assisted by the efforts of for-
gotten researchers. The scientific elite themselves all began
their careers in this category, as unrecognized researchers
slowly working their way up through the hierarchy with a
succession of accomplishments. Thus, there are many scien-
tists who may be boosted into the ranks of the great with
the award of a great prize, or the making of a single im-
portant new discovery. These often require being lucky,
or being friendly with the right people. Without the extra
lift provided by these symbols of recognition, many scien-
tists would be categorized as “merely successful” rather than
great. Max Planck, for example, was highly regarded among
his peers around the end of the 19th century, but it is hard
to believe that his name would be much recognized today if
he had not decided to attack the problem of blackbody ra-
diation. Although his solution is testament to his brilliance,
we can also recognize in it a strong element of chance — the
timeliness of his choice and of his being so well prepared in
the theoretical tools needed to find the quantum solution.
3 The great man theory
The “great man theory” is an idea that has been around
throughout the ages but was promulgated in the 19th cen-
tury and still influences historical writing and thinking to-
day. Its central thesis is that there are men and women
whose personal abilities (intelligence, charisma, etc.) are
so far above the ordinary that they have a widespread and
lasting influence over events. Accepting the great man the-
ory, however, implies that one must also take seriously the
idea that there could also be a corresponding “negative great
man”. This does not mean an insignificant man, but rather
someone who is highly influential in a negative way, by im-
peding progress.[8] There are more than a few physicists
who view Niels Bohr’s influence on quantum mechanics in
this vein.[9, 10] In the late 19th century, an unsympathetic
view may put Lord Kelvin’s evangelizing for the vortex atom
theory, despite its lack of empirical validation, in a similar
category. These are physics’ equivalent of the incompetent
monarchs in Europe’s early modern period — kings and
queens whose decisions were more ruinous to their king-
doms than no decision at all.
Although influential, the “great man” concept is not
without a countertheory. The obverse does not have a catchy
name, but can be called the social constructivist theory —
that influential figures are the products of their environ-
ments and societies, so that their success is contingent on the
social conditions around them. In other words, they were
lucky, and they had help. The biographies of most scien-
tists can be re-framed in this context — that it is by their
teachers and by the friendship of their peers that great sci-
entists learned to focus their thoughts and achieve new in-
sights. This perspective has influenced modern historiogra-
phy to shift narratives away from individual leaders to social
frameworks that describe the wider forces that shape history
beyond those of single individuals. Thus, modern histori-
cal writing emphasizes that Alexander the Great would not
have achieved such a wide influence over history if his fa-
ther had not produced an army for him that was primed
for conquest. Likewise, Caesar had the stolid Roman le-
gions, Napoleon the élan of revolutionary France’s soldiery.
In each case, these leaders would not have achieved “great-
ness” without their situation being prepared for them. They
were not just unusually smart, they were also lucky. Simi-
larly, some scientists arrive at the scene with just the right
set of ideas to achieve impressive results.
Conflicting opinions about these two theories drives
much discussion, but while the great man and the social con-
structivist theories are often phrased as being incompatible
with one another, the truth clearly lies somewhere between.
Men and women of outstanding genius clearly exist, but it is
also clear that genius alone is not enough to lead them to ex-
traordinary achievements. For that, they need luck and the
help of their peers.
4 Scientific discoveries as the tip of a pyramid
of achievements
Since most scientists are ignored by history, should we con-
sider them just as worker-ants and an unfortunate waste of
resources? This kind of condescending perspective follows
the natural hierarchy in which many scientists prefer to view
scientific endeavors, placing theoretical work at the pinna-
cle, experimental work filling out the middle, engineering at
the bottom, and, one supposes, the nonscientific population
trudging through the dirty unlit caverns underpinning the
whole structure. This view persists even though engineer-
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ing problems have inspired many of the greatest scientists to
their highest accomplishments.
Many discoveries exist in the gray region between the
great and the merely useful — discoveries that have had a
substantial impact but which have not been widely recog-
nized. One example might be that of the Fourier transform
spectrometer (FTS), which helped many fields of science to
take measurements that were difficult or impossible with ex-
isting instrumentation. It also provided the first strong ev-
idence for the advantages of computational sensing, a field
that has expanded greatly with the increase in computing
power over the past decades. However, since the invention
of the FTS was a collective effort by a number of individ-
uals, most of whom were not attention-seeking, no single
researcher’s name has become associated with it, and this
may contribute to its unexpected obscurity. In modern sci-
ence, most scientific achievements are the product of col-
lective effort by many scientists that accumulate into a sin-
gle recognized fundamental advance. Once the achievement
is clearly demonstrated and acknowledged, the background
work needed to get there is no longer useful and disappears
from memory. Planck’s great discovery of the equation for
blackbody radiation built on the empirical law discovered
by Wilhelm Wien, a less-known but still prominent physicist,
who himself built his ideas on the work of the little-known
English physicist George Searle.[11] In this way, progress in
science is more an accumulation of small efforts than a set of
distinct “heroic” leaps in our understanding.
Further weakening the wall separating the great from the
rank-and-file, we can examine two examples of great inno-
vations which made an individual researcher famous, but
which were actually the cumulative effort of a team of sci-
entists and engineers, most members of which are little re-
membered. The first example is Mie scattering, a theory that
is used throughout physics for calculating the distribution
of light scattered from spherically symmetric particles larger
than the light wavelength, such as for water droplets in air.
The German mathematician Alfred Clebsch (1861) was the
first to deal with this problem, and worked out much of
its mathematical details, but these were not widely recog-
nized as important at the time. The Danish theorist Ludvig
Lorenz (1890) later published a monumental memoir on the
subject, building on the work of Clebsch, but published in a
little-read journal and died soon afterwards, so that his work
never received attention.[12] The next 50 years were to see a
series of famous names independently produce the results
which can be found in Lorenz’ long manuscript. The next
to deal with the subject were J. W. Nicholson (1906), Peter
Debye (1908), and Gustav Mie (1908) himself. Rather than
deriving a series of new fundamental results, Mie’s innova-
tion was primarily to express the equations in a form more
suitable to numerical calculations, and to assume that the
optical constants of bulk metal materials can be used to rep-
resent optical properties of metal nanoparticles as well.[13]
This latter assumption allowed him to apply the theory to
an example of contemporary interest: the colors produced
by colloids of gold particles, but it was the former innova-
tion that was crucial for associating his name with the the-
ory. In fact, Mie’s paper was not recognized as foundational
by the scientific community at the time, since its application
required prodigious calculations. Even Mie himself did not
seem to give it much weight, and it was only with the advent
of computers in the 1950s that the computations could be
made practical.[14] By that time, the theory had been refined
by another series of researchers that worked to generalize
the approach so that it could be applied to a wider realm of
scattering problems: T. J. I’A. Bromwich (1920), G. N. Watson
(1918), F. P. White (1922), B. van der Pol (1937), and H. Brem-
mer (1937) all contributed towards advancing the theory and
making it into the useful tool so widely applied today.[12]
The decision to attach Mie’s name to the overall construct
thus occurred long after the publication, by selecting his pa-
per as the first to frame the problem in a way suited to com-
puter calculation.
A second example of scientific teamwork is the Kalman
filter — a signal processing technique named for Rudolf E.
Kálmán, though Peter Swerling simultaneously developed a
similar algorithm. Stanley Schmidt is generally credited with
developing the first implementation of a Kalman filter. He —
or a member of his team of engineers — made the important
practical realization that the filter could be divided into two
distinct parts, with one part for time periods between sensor
outputs and another part for incorporating measurements,
dramatically improving its utility. Later he and his group
also realized that modifying the problem to linearize about
the estimated state rather than the current state further im-
proves performance, and is now referred to as the “extended
Kalman filter”.[15] James Potter next found a way to im-
prove the algorithm’s numerical stability through the proce-
dure now known as square-root filtering. Finally, Richard S.
Bucy also contributed to the theory, showing how to convert
its use for continuous functions.[16] Thus, while Kalman’s
initial concept was the starting point, it required a team of
scientists to adapt it and improve upon it in order for it to
become the important tool that it is today.
These are two important discoveries where the name at-
tached to them did only a secondary part of the effort, and
sequence of smaller discoveries by a team of researchers built
upon the initial theoretical concept to make it both more
practical and more general. In this way, discoveries which
immortalize a scientist’s name are often derived from the
work of a team, and can arise out of often-disdained tech-
nical drudgery of small improvements. Thus, it can be sur-
prisingly difficult to appraise the quality of a scientist’s oeu-
vre and decide on his or her greatness until long past their
time, and even then we find that many discoveries are mis-
attributed to someone else.[17] Implicit in this conclusion
is that there must be many scientists who were regarded
as of the 1st rank during their lifetimes but who were later
downgraded to merely “good”. And indeed there are many,
though it requires a close reading of the contemporary scien-
tific literature to find them.
5 Deep discoveries and shallow drudgery
Much of the conversation among scientists centers around
praise for great achievements and indirectly derogates or-
dinary science as drudgery. Yet in our daily lives as scien-
tists, even for the greatest among us, it is in combating these
ordinary tasks that we spend most of our time. And it is
often this drudgery that fuels the insights needed to push
further into the unknown. Tycho Brahe’s time-consuming
toil of building precision astronomical data was necessary
for Johannes Kepler to found a new theory of planetary or-
bits. Kepler himself condemned as a “treadmill of mathe-
matical calculations” the laborious work needed to prove his
most famous results, while constantly desiring to return to
his “philosophical speculations”.[18] Yet it is for the insights
derived from his tedious labors that he is still known today,
while his philosophical speculations are generally regarded
as uninteresting. All research involves tedium. While some
of the tedium leads nowhere much, some of it also leads to
important results, and it is only in hindsight that we can see
the difference.
From the examples of achievements given lesser recogni-
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tion, we can see that what scientists regard as the defining
difference between the great and the merely good is profun-
dity much more than productivity. A productive engineer
is treated with a degree of grudging respect, but little more
than that, while a profound new theory is treated with a de-
gree of awe. The following quote from a theoretical physicist
is a typical outgrowth of this perspective: [19]
Many people can solve a problem. But the [im-
portant] skill is to come up with ... the right prob-
lems. [Problems] that are not going to be only
incremental progress but [which] really could
make a difference. ...That is what distinguishes
great scientists from good scientists — the ability
to [see] what is really worth working on.
Many researchers have been given similar advice. In a se-
ries of interviews with Nobel laureates, Robert Merton con-
cluded that “Almost to a man [Nobel laureates have in inter-
views laid] great emphasis on the importance of problem-
finding, not only problem-solving. They [emphasize the
need to seize] upon problems that are of fundamental im-
portance [in contrast to the pedestrian work involving] end-
less detail or work just to improve accuracy....”[20] And yet
Nobelists have also been notoriously bad at doing this. Con-
stant striving for profundity can often lead to failure, stifling
progress and turning a scientist’s attention away from what
is curious to what is “deep”. This trap has caught many
physicists attracted by their ambitions, ignoring the fact that
little problems sometimes turn out to be important pieces
of bigger problems, and which by luck may turn out to be
pieces of deep puzzles.
This behavior of working with an eye towards achiev-
ing recognition also underlies the vexing behavior of mod-
ern science where researchers hop from one trendy research
topic to another, as the pulse of the crowd changes from
year to year. Young researchers seeking the acclaim of their
peers are forced to focus on creating a research program that
will be influential rather than what is scientifically interest-
ing. While it is hard to disagree that this is good advice for
a successful career in modern science, it illustrates the de-
gree to which science has become a profession rather than an
avocation. Using the hierarchical language reflexively used
by many physicists, perhaps we’re all engineers now, even
those who vehemently protest otherwise.
Despite our yearning for success on deep problems, sci-
entific work involves much tedium and care towards weari-
some detail, so that our daily lives contrast with our ambi-
tious goals. However, if see this “problem of greatness” in
the eye that we view our own publications, then much of
the tension between ambition and reality falls away. Scien-
tific publications show a polished version of actual events,
displaying the successes and only rarely the failures encoun-
tered to reach the conclusions. While this polishing process
has been maligned by many as a kind of dissembling, we
can also recognize it as being inevitable. Anyone who has
read through another person’s scientific journals likely un-
derstands that there is little that is more tedious and uninter-
esting. While reading we have to suppress the constant urge
to flip through the pages and get to the conclusion. This is ex-
actly what the polished publication does for us. In the same
way, when a scientific advance achieves recognition for be-
ing important, the polished version of it is what survives in
peoples minds, and the messy work of getting there is forgot-
ten as uninteresting. But that is a different thing from saying
that it is unimportant; the tedium is necessary to build the
final result. We may forget the little achievements needed to
get there, but the result would have been impossible without
them.
6 Why focus on priority?
After the long look into what makes an elite and what makes
an ordinary scientist, a reader may come to feel that the
constant focus on priority for discoveries seems senseless.
Whether Newton or Leibniz, or for that matter some un-
known John Smith, invented calculus has no real bearing
on the working of science today. Establishing priority and
celebrating discovery may be the currency by which scien-
tists are rewarded, but if someone else independently dis-
covered the same thing a year later, then it is hard to exalt
the original advance as fundamental and unique.[?] Instead,
such discoveries have the feeling of being inevitable in the
long run, so that the timing of the original discovery is con-
tingent on a lucky confluence of conditions. Modern science
in particular is pervaded with these discoveries. Scientific
publications these days are all reports of small advances, not
big leaps, and build heavily upon the prior work of other
researchers, so that the interconnectedness of the whole pro-
cess often makes it difficult to attribute primacy to a single
individual or a small group.
Viewing the sociology of science from a distance in
this way, it becomes hard to take seriously the innumer-
able squabbles over priority, especially when the antagonists
protest their dedication to the purity of scientific pursuit and
indifference towards compensation. Thankfully, not every-
one joins in the bickering. Peter Fellgett, after looking back
over his career, reflected that [21]
the greatest pleasure ... comes from recalling
how, when we were all striving to create some-
thing new, there were from time to time in-
evitably disagreements and tensions, yet when
we meet today these have been purged by time
and experience and ... [we see how the] ideas
originating from each of us were plied and wo-
ven into ... the tapestry of human achievement.
Thus, many scientists do see these quarrels over priority as
unseemly, and have shown ambivalence towards pushing
priority on their own discoveries. Outright dismissing of
priority may seem an option, but is not one that the scien-
tific community has been willing to accept as it disaffirms the
value of originality and promotes wasteful repetition. This
tension between insisting on valuing priority versus recog-
nizing its unseemliness forces on each individual a difficult
choice over how to deal with the conflicting norms.[22]
7 Conclusion
For someone who focuses on immortalizing his or her
achievements into the history of science, failing to achieve
greatness is a problem of unfulfilled ambition for personal
gain. However, for a scientist who learns to focus instead on
the joy of learning and discovery, and leave the disputes over
priority to others, then the labor is its own reward. For those
who adhere to the latter view, the annual outcry over the
awarding of the Nobel prize is a pointless waste. Whether
a scientist is widely recognized enough to be awarded such
a high-profile prize should not be a reflection on whether
or not their work is valuable. Peter Fellgett, in response to
hearing one such complaint, replied that “It may be true that
some laboratories make the ‘pursuit of Nobel prizes [as] the
ultimate aim’. If so, the more fools they [are].... One ex-
pects scientists to have something better to do than to dis-
play the envy of socialites denied admittance to an exclusive
club.”[23]
In modern science, the faster pace of communication
means that the piecemeal advances of science are becoming
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steadily smaller and more numerous. Scientific publications
exhibit smaller research advances than before, and the work
is increasingly distributed among team members than a soli-
tary effort. As a result, the “greats” of today have less leisure
to let their theories mature before deciding to publish. There
are more mistakes, more partial results, more knitting of re-
sults among multiple researchers. The time of great discov-
eries by individuals has largely passed. And perhaps the
scientists left unrecognized are more important than science
generally credits us to be.
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